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Abstract 
This paper introduces a generalized money (M2) multiplier formula to 
the literature for a monetary system with Reserve Option Mechanism (ROM). 
Various features of the proposed multiplier are then explored using monthly 
Turkish data during the decade 2005 to 2015. We report a step increase in the 
magnitude and a slight upward adjustment in the long-run trend of the multiplier 
with the adoption of ROM. We provide evidence for substantial change in the 
seasonal pattern of the multiplier, cash ratio, required and excess reserves under 
ROM. We show that money (M2) multiplier is less volatile in a monetary system 
with ROM and discuss the subsequent stabilizing influence of more predictable 
multiplier on the foreign exchange market. 
Keywords: Money multiplier, macroprudential policy, reserve option mechanism, 
reserve requirements, financial stability 
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I. Introduction 
Capital flows, measured by percentage share of GDP, to emerging markets and majority 
of developing economies have increased more than twofold on average during the five 
years preceding global financial crisis of 2007-08 (Gallagher & Tian, 2014). Soaring 
volatility and sudden stops are considered as two fundamental elements of capital flows 
to emerging markets during and aftermath of global financial crisis. Surges in 
international capital flows and financial stability concerns led many emerging market 
central banks to adopt alternative macroprudential policy instruments like reserve 
requirements and capital requirements. 
Reserve requirement ratios have been important monetary policy instruments for 
many central banks. Federico, Vegh, and Vuletin 2014 reports around two thirds of 
developing economies have used reserve requirement policies for macroeconomic 
stabilization purposes in comparison to none industrialized country since 2004. In this 
research, we focus on Reserve Option Mechanism which we consider as a modern 
version of reserve requirement policies. 
With macroeconomic and financial stability in mind, the Central Bank of the 
Republic of Turkey (CBRT) developed Reserve Option Mechanism (ROM) an 
unconventional reserve requirement policy aiming to reduce adverse effects of short 
term capital flows and exchange rate volatility aftermath of global financial crisis of 
2007-08. ROM is a mechanism that allows commercial banks to keep a certain 
percentage of their Turkish lira required reserves in foreign currencies: USD and Euro, 
and gold1. ROM is considered acting as an automatic stabilizer in the face of external 
                                                 
1 Foreign currencies that can be maintained for Turkish lira required reserves have been limited 
to USD only as of August 2014.  
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imbalances and hence it promises to be a potentially useful reserve requirement policy 
instrument for macroeconomic and financial stability (Alper, Kara, & Yorukoglu, 
2013).  
In this paper, we study the behavior of money multiplier in a monetary system 
where Reserve Option Mechanism is effectively used as a policy instrument. To this 
end, we analytically derive a generalized money (M2) multiplier formulae and assess 
the impact of Reserve Option Mechanism on the multiplier and its components. Using 
Turkish data, we show that money (M2) multiplier increased in a stepwise fashion due 
to introduction of ROM. We discuss how the rise in the value of the multiplier 
reinforces the role of ROM as an automatic stabilizing policy tool. In addition, we study 
seasonal patterns and stability of money (M2) multiplier and its components. We report 
that seasonal patterns of money (M2) multiplier has changed and money (M2) 
multiplier became significantly less volatile with the inception of ROM facility to the 
monetary system. 
Figure 1. FX Reserve Option Mechanism Utilization Rates 
 
 
Notes: Data has biweekly frequency (per-maintenance period) covering the period from 9/30/2011 to 
3/27/2015. The diagram shows the FX Reserve Option Mechanism utilization rates for the banking 
sector. 
Source: Electronic Data Delivery System (EDDS) of the Central Bank of Republic of Turkey. 
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Reserve Option Mechanism (ROM) consists two principal elements: reserve 
option ratio (ROR) and reserve option coefficients (ROCs) which are both set by the 
central bank. The upper limit for the proportion of domestic currency required reserves 
that is allowed to be held in foreign currency (FX) and gold is governed by reserve 
option ratio (ROR). The amount of FX and gold that can be held against per domestic 
currency required reserves is called the reserve option coefficient (ROC). Our focus in 
this research is on FX option of ROM due to the fact that Turkish banking sector has 
been utilizing FX option under ROM intensively as depicted by Figure 1. Due to 
Turkish banking sector’s approach to FX option, the composition of required reserves 
held at the central bank has changed dramatically as shown by Figure 2. 
Figure 2. Required Reserves to be maintained for TL Liabilities under ROM 
 
 
Notes: Data has biweekly frequency (per-maintenance period) covering the period from 9/30/2011 to 
3/27/2015.  
Source: Electronic Data Delivery System (EDDS) of the Central Bank of Republic of Turkey. 
 
The Turkish central bank has been employing ROM as an alternative 
macroprudential monetary policy tool quite actively. Figure 3 presents reserve option 
ratios and the corresponding FX reserve option coefficients since the introduction of 
ROM in Sept. 2011. The diagram shows that there has been constant amendments in 
both reserve option ratios and the corresponding FX reserve option coefficients until 
Mar. 2015. 
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Figure 3. Evolution of Reserve Option Ratios (ROR) and corresponding FX Reserve 
Option Coefficients (ROCs) 
 
 
Notes: Data has biweekly frequency (per required reserves maintenance period) covering the period 
from 9/30/2011 to 3/27/2015. The figures inside the stacked bar chart show effective foreign exchange 
(FX) Reserve Option Coefficients (ROCs) and the corresponding tranches as of the given dates 
(required reserves maintenance periods) on the horizontal axis. For instance, effective FX ROCs as of 
Aug.31.2012 are 1.1, 1.4, 1.7, 1.9, and 2.0 for the corresponding tranches of 0-30, 30-35, 35-40, 40-45, 
45-50, 50-55, and 55-60 percent. The ROCs 3.30, 3.50, 3.70, 3.90, and 4.10 located at the top right 
corner of the diagram correspond the tranches of 55-56, 56-57, 57-58, 58-59, and 59-60 percent, 
respectively. The solid black line is obtained by connecting fifteen realized average FX ROC data 
points for the banking sector for the corresponding fifteen dates (required reserves maintenance 
periods) on the horizontal axis. Realized average FX ROCs are obtained by taking the ratio of required 
reserves kept in FX to total required reserves multiplied by the percentage use of FX ROM facility. 
Source: Electronic Data Delivery System (EDDS) of the Central Bank of Republic of Turkey. 
II. Literature Review 
There is a long and established literature on money multiplier that links reserve money 
to supply of broad money. In this tradition, monetary base is viewed as an important 
monetary policy instrument through which central banks control the money supply. In 
modern economics, though, the use official interest rates is considered as the main 
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policy instrument rather than reserve requirements. Having said that, monetary 
authorities in emerging economies still use reserve requirements extensively as an 
accompanying monetary policy instrument. 
In contrast to several work on money multiplier, studies on Reserve Option 
Mechanism (ROM) are not much while the number of studies are on the rise. Alper et 
al., 2013 introduce Reserve Option Mechanism and explain the way this mechanism 
function through banks’ decision making on reserves. Küçüksaraç and Özel, 2012 
compute optimal Reserve Option Coefficients (ROCs), important elements of ROM 
facility, where they provide evidence for high sensitivity of breakeven ROCs to funds 
denominated in foreign currency. Değerli and Fendoğlu, 2015 study the impact of ROM 
in reducing the volatility of foreign exchange expectations. Oduncu, Akçelik, and 
Ermişoğlu, 2013 show that ROM is an effective policy tool in reducing volatility of 
Turkish lira. 
This paper touches upon two lines of work on money multiplier and Reserve 
Option Mechanism. There are two recent and closely related studies to current research 
on ROM. Aslaner, Çıplak, Kara, and Küçüksaraç, 2014 use bank level data where they 
show variations in banks’ ROM utilization rates are mainly explained by variations in 
short term domestic interest rates. Hence, they argue, counter active policy responses to 
capital flows, higher/lower interest rates during outflows/inflows, undermine automatic 
stabilizing feature of the ROM facility. This paper shows that domestic short term 
interest rates automatically re-adjust upward/downward to some extent during capital 
outflows/inflows via changes in money (M2) multiplier which in turn depends on 
banks’ utilization rate of the ROM facility. Hence, excessive counter active interest rate 
policy responses may reduce automatic stabilizing ability of the ROM facility rather 
than the conduct of interest rate policy itself in response to capital flows. 
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Unlike Jayaratne and Morgan’s, 2000 finding on limited bank lending channel 
of monetary policy, Alper, Binici, Demiralp, Kara, and Özlü, 2014 find banks’ lending 
behavior respond significantly to reserve requirement induced monetary policy. Alper et 
al., 2014 produce cost based effective reserve requirement ratio which negatively 
depends on the banks’ utilization rate of ROM facility as long as banks find FX 
borrowing is less costly than that of in domestic currency. They argue short term 
borrowing from the central bank is not a close substitute for deposits for banks. Therefore, 
banks’ lending behavior respond significantly to reserve requirements and the introduction 
of ROM facility. Our research shows that, since reserve requirements under ROM influence 
banks’ lending behavior, broad money supply must be linked to reserve requirements via a 
modified money multiplier under ROM. 
III. Data description and preliminary empirics 
This study uses monthly frequency data from Turkey covering the period of December 
2005 to February 20152. All data is secondary and gathered from Electronic Data 
Delivery System (EDDS) of the Central Bank of Republic of Turkey. Data table in 
Appendix I reports raw data used to produce diagrams, obtain summary statistics and 
estimates, and conduct various statistical tests. 
We adopt IMF definition of reserve money (monetary base 𝑀𝐵) where 𝑀𝐵 
equals to the sum of currency in circulation 𝐶, total domestic currency reserves 𝑅, and 
demand deposits of banks held at the Central Bank. In the data table in Appendix I, 
there is negligible amount of discrepancy between the monetary base 𝑀𝐵 and the sum 
of currency in circulation 𝐶 and total domestic currency reserves 𝑅 is due to deposits of 
banks held at the Central Bank. Following the standard definition, money supply (M2) 
                                                 
2 Unless it is stated otherwise underneath figures, tables etc. given in the text. 
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is a broad money measure comprising domestic currency in circulation, checkable and 
time deposits (excluding foreign currency deposits) held by the public at commercial 
banks and other depository institutions. Time deposits 𝑇𝐷 consists of one-month, three-
months, six-months, one-year and longer deposits. Common reserve requirement ratios 
𝑟𝑟1and 𝑟𝑟2 applies to domestic currency checkable deposits and time deposits, 
respectively until January 6, 20113. Time deposits reserve requirement ratio 𝑟𝑟2 is the 
weighted average of the required ratios for one-month, three-months, six-months, one-
year and longer deposits. Monthly interbank money market rates 𝑟𝑡 are calculated by 
taking simple average of the daily weighted averages of interbank overnight (O/N) 
rates.  
Figure 4. Realized Average FX ROCs and FX Rates 
 
 
Notes: Data has biweekly frequency (per required reserves maintenance period) covering the period 
from 9/30/2011 to 3/27/2015. The black and red lines show realized average FX ROCs for the entire 
banking sector and 14-day simple average FX rates (Turkish lira per USD). Realized average FX 
ROCs are obtained by taking the ratio of required reserves kept in FX to total required reserves 
multiplied by the percentage use of FX ROM facility. 
Source: Electronic Data Delivery System (EDDS) of the Central Bank of Republic of Turkey. 
                                                 
3 In Press Release No. 2010-41 of Dec. 17, 2010, the CBRT announced the Turkish lira required 
reserve ratio would be differentiated according to the maturity structure of deposits 
starting January 2011. 
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 The model in Section IV shows that threshold reserve options coefficients depend on 
spot exchange rates. To configure these relationship, we use daily nominal spot 
exchange rate 𝑒𝑡 (domestic currency per USD) to obtain 14-day simple averages and 
monthly rates4. The correlation coefficient between realized average FX reserve option 
coefficients (ROCs) and nominal spot exchange rates is about +0.75 as illustrated by 
Figure 4. 
IV. The model 
The existing literature links money supply 𝑀𝑆 to monetary base 𝑀𝐵 through money 
multiplier 𝑚. This relationship is usually depicted as following. 
𝑀𝑆𝑡 = 𝑚𝑡 ×𝑀𝐵𝑡 (1) 
The total amount of reserves 𝑅 in the banking system equals to the sum of total 
required reserves 𝑅𝑅 and excess reserves 𝐸𝑅 i.e. 𝑅𝑡 = ∑ 𝑅𝑅𝑡
𝑖 + ∑ 𝐸𝑅𝑡
𝑖𝑖=𝑁
𝑖=1
𝑖=𝑁
𝑖=1  where 
𝑅𝑅𝑡
𝑖 and 𝐸𝑅𝑡
𝑖  stand for required and excess reserves held by bank 𝑖 at time period 𝑡. 
According to this formulation 𝑁 banks operate in the banking sector. 
Assume reserve requirement ratio on domestic currency checkable deposits 𝐷𝑡
𝑖 is 
𝑟𝑟1and on time deposits 𝑇𝐷𝑡
𝑖 is 𝑟𝑟2 where 𝑟𝑟2 < 𝑟𝑟1 < 1. Note that how much domestic 
currency checkable vs. time deposits to be held by public at commercial banks and other 
depository institutions would depend on market interest rate 𝑟. We assume the public 
hold a fraction of its domestic currency checkable deposits as time deposits i.e. 
∑ 𝑇𝐷𝑡
𝑖𝑖=𝑁
𝑖=1 = 𝜌(𝑟)∑ 𝐷𝑡
𝑖𝑖=𝑁
𝑖=1  and the public tend to utilize domestic currency time deposits 
more as market interest rises i.e. 𝜌′(𝑟) > 0. Hence, in a monetary system without 
                                                 
4 The liabilities subject to reserve requirements are calculated on Friday every two weeks in 
Turkish banking sector i.e. biweekly required reserves maintenance period applies. 
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Reserve Options Mechanism (ROM), total required reserves (in terms of domestic 
currency) in the banking system equals to 
𝑅𝑅𝑡 =∑𝑟𝑟1 × 𝐷𝑡
𝑖 +∑𝑟𝑟2 × 𝑇𝐷𝑡
𝑖
𝑖=𝑁
𝑖=1
= 
𝑖=𝑁
𝑖=1
[𝑟𝑟1 + 𝜌(𝑟)𝑟𝑟2]∑𝐷𝑡
𝑖
𝑖=𝑁
𝑖=1
 (2) 
Suppose banks hold 𝑘1(𝑟) portion of checkable deposits and 𝑘2(𝑟) portion of 
time deposits as excess reserves. We assume precautionary demand for excess reserves 
for checkable deposits is greater than that of time deposits i.e. 𝑘2(𝑟) < 𝑘1(𝑟). Since 
excess reserves don’t earn any interest, excess reserve demand for any given level of 
checkable and time deposits is negatively related to market interest rates  𝑘1
′ (𝑟) < 0, 
𝑘2
′ (𝑟) < 0. Hence, the total excess reserves in the banking system is given by 
𝐸𝑅𝑡 = 𝑘1(𝑟)∑𝐷𝑡
𝑖
𝑖=𝑁
𝑖=1
+ 𝑘2(𝑟)∑𝑇𝐷𝑡
𝑖
𝑖=𝑁
𝑖=1
= [𝑘1(𝑟) + 𝜌(𝑟)𝑘2(𝑟)]∑𝐷𝑡
𝑖
𝑖=𝑁
𝑖=1
 (3) 
Putting equations (2) and (3) give total reserves 𝑅 (in domestic currency 
equivalent units) in the banking system as described in equation 4 below.  
𝑅𝑡 = {𝑟𝑟1 + 𝜌(𝑟)𝑟𝑟2 + 𝑘1(𝑟) + 𝜌(𝑟)𝑘2(𝑟)}∑𝐷𝑡
𝑖
𝑖=𝑁
𝑖=1
 (4) 
In a monetary system with Reserve Option Mechanism the banks are allowed to 
keep up to reserve option ratio (ROR) of their domestic currency required reserves in 
foreign exchange (FX) and/or gold. Hence, total required reserves held by the banks 
wishing to utilize the ROM facility can be written as 
𝑅𝑅𝑡 = [𝑟𝑟1 + 𝜌(𝑟)𝑟𝑟2]∑𝐷𝑡
𝑖 × (1 − 𝑅𝑂𝑅𝑡
𝑖)
𝑖=𝐾
𝑖=1
+ [𝑟𝑟1 + 𝜌(𝑟)𝑟𝑟2]∑𝐷𝑡
𝑖 × 𝑅𝑂𝑅𝑡
𝑖 × 𝑅𝑂𝐶(𝑅𝑂𝑅𝑡
𝑖)
𝑖=𝐾
𝑖=1
 (5) 
In equation 5, the first term stands for the total required reserves held in 
domestic currency whereas the second term shows the total foreign currency or gold 
held by the banks against domestic currency required reserves (in domestic currency 
11 
 
equivalent units). According to this formulation 𝑅𝑂𝑅𝑡
𝑖 stands for utilization rate of 
ROM by bank 𝑖 at time period 𝑡, and 𝑅𝑂𝐶(𝑅𝑂𝑅𝑡
𝑖) is the corresponding reserve option 
coefficient as set by the Central Bank. Any bank 𝑖 deciding on 𝑅𝑂𝑅𝑡
𝑖 at any time period 
𝑡 automatically determines which trench of 𝑅𝑂𝐶 it must use. This formulation assumes 
𝐾 ≤ 𝑁 banks utilize ROM facility in the banking sector. 
Using equation 5 along with equations 3 and 4 give us total reserves at time 
period 𝑡 in a monetary system with 𝑅𝑂𝑀 as described by equation 6.  
𝑅𝑡 = ([𝑟𝑟1 + 𝜌(𝑟)𝑟𝑟2]∑𝐷𝑡
𝑖 × (1 − 𝑅𝑂𝑅𝑡
𝑖)
𝑖=𝐾
𝑖=1
+ [𝑟𝑟1 + 𝜌(𝑟)𝑟𝑟2] ∑ 𝐷𝑡
𝑖
𝑖=𝑁
𝑖=𝐾+1
+ [𝑘1(𝑟) + 𝜌(𝑟)𝑘2(𝑟)]∑𝐷𝑡
𝑖
𝑖=𝑁
𝑖=1
)
+ {[𝑟𝑟1 + 𝜌(𝑟)𝑟𝑟2]∑𝐷𝑡
𝑖 × 𝑅𝑂𝑅𝑡
𝑖 × 𝑅𝑂𝐶(𝑅𝑂𝑅𝑡
𝑖)
𝑖=𝐾
𝑖=1
} 
(6) 
In equation 6, the first term inside large parentheses and the second term inside large 
curly bracket stand for reserves held in domestic currency and reserves held in foreign 
currency (in domestic currency equivalent units). According to equation 6, 𝐾 banks 
utilize ROM facility whereas 𝑁 − 𝐾 banks don’t. Because the monetary base 𝑀𝐵 
equals to the sum of total domestic currency reserves and currency in circulation 𝐶, we 
generate equation 7 linking the monetary base to checkable deposits and currency in 
circulation by dropping the term inside large curly bracket in equation 6 to obtain: 
𝑀𝐵𝑡 = [𝑟𝑟1 + 𝜌(𝑟)𝑟𝑟2]∑𝐷𝑡
𝑖 × (1 − 𝑅𝑂𝑅𝑡
𝑖)
𝑖=𝐾
𝑖=1
+ [𝑟𝑟1 + 𝜌(𝑟)𝑟𝑟2] ∑ 𝐷𝑡
𝑖
𝑖=𝑁
𝑖=𝐾+1
+ [𝑘1(𝑟) + 𝜌(𝑟)𝑘2(𝑟) + 𝑐𝑡]∑𝐷𝑡
𝑖
𝑖=𝑁
𝑖=1
 
(7) 
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where we assume non-bank public holds fraction 𝑐 of the total amount of checkable 
deposits as currency i.e. 𝐶𝑡 = 𝑐𝑡 × ∑ 𝐷𝑡
𝑖𝑖=𝑁
𝑖=1 . 
Inserting equation 7 into equation 1 yields equation 8 linking money supply 𝑀𝑆 
to checkable deposits via money (M2) multiplier 𝑚𝑅𝑂𝑀 in a monetary system where 
ROM facility is in use. 
𝑀𝑆𝑡 = 𝑚2,𝑡
𝑅𝑂𝑀 × [[𝑟𝑟1 + 𝜌(𝑟)𝑟𝑟2]∑𝐷𝑡
𝑖 × (1 − 𝑅𝑂𝑅𝑡
𝑖)
𝑖=𝐾
𝑖=1
+ [𝑟𝑟1 + 𝜌(𝑟)𝑟𝑟2] ∑ 𝐷𝑡
𝑖
𝑖=𝑁
𝑖=𝐾+1
+ [𝑘1(𝑟) + 𝜌(𝑟)𝑘2(𝑟) + 𝑐𝑡]∑𝐷𝑡
𝑖
𝑖=𝑁
𝑖=1
] 
(8) 
Following the standard definition, money supply (M2) is a broad money 
measure comprising domestic currency in circulation, checkable and time deposits 
(excluding foreign currency deposits) held by the public at commercial banks and other 
depository institutions. According to this definition money (M2) supply can be written 
as following. 
𝑀𝑆𝑡 =∑𝐷𝑡
𝑖
𝑖=𝑁
𝑖=1
+∑𝑇𝐷𝑡
𝑖
𝑖=𝑁
𝑖=1
+ 𝑐𝑡∑𝐷𝑡
𝑖
𝑖=𝑁
𝑖=1
= [1 + 𝜌(𝑟) + 𝑐𝑡]∑𝐷𝑡
𝑖
𝑖=𝑁
𝑖=1
 (9) 
Inserting equation 9 into 8 and solving for 𝑚2,𝑡
𝑅𝑂𝑀 produces money (M2) multiplier 
under ROM as summarized by equation 10. 
𝑚2,𝑡
𝑅𝑂𝑀 =
1 + 𝜌(𝑟) + 𝑐𝑡
[𝑟𝑟1 + 𝑟𝑟2𝜌(𝑟)] {1 −
∑ 𝐷𝑡
𝑖 × 𝑅𝑂𝑅𝑡
𝑖𝑖=𝐾
𝑖=1
∑ 𝐷𝑡
𝑖𝑖=𝑁
𝑖=1
} + [𝑘1(𝑟) + 𝑘2(𝑟)𝜌(𝑟)] + 𝑐𝑡
 
(10) 
According to equation 10, money (M2) multiplier under ROM is a function of the 
currency ratio 𝑐 and 𝜌(𝑟) chosen by depositors, the excess reserve ratio 𝑘1(𝑟) +
𝑘2(𝑟)𝜌(𝑟), the number of banks 𝐾 utilizing ROM, and the utilization rate of reserve 
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option mechanism 𝑅𝑂𝑅𝑡
𝑖 optimized by the banks, and, finally, the required reserve 
ratios 𝑟𝑟1 and 𝑟𝑟2 set by the monetary authority
5. Note that money (M2) multiplier 
under ROM turns into a standard money (M2) multiplier 𝑚2 as in Goodfriend, 1982 
given in equation 11 in the absence of ROM facility (i.e. 𝑅𝑂𝑅𝑡
𝑖 = 0 ∀ 𝑖) and/or when no 
bank utilizes ROM facility (i.e. 𝐾 = 0). 
𝑚2,𝑡 =
1 + 𝜌(𝑟) + 𝑐𝑡
𝑟𝑟1 + 𝑟𝑟2𝜌(𝑟) + [𝑘1(𝑟) + 𝑘2(𝑟)𝜌(𝑟)] + 𝑐𝑡
 (11) 
It is straightforward to show that money (M2) multiplier under ROM 𝑚2,𝑡
𝑅𝑂𝑀 is at least as 
large as the standard money multiplier 𝑚2,𝑡 in the absence of ROM facility due to the 
fact that ∑ 𝐷𝑡
𝑖 × 𝑅𝑂𝑅𝑡
𝑖𝑖=𝐾
𝑖=1 ≥ 0, 𝑟𝑟1 >,  𝑟𝑟2 > 0 and 𝜌(𝑟) > 0. 
According to equation 10, calculating M2 multiplier requires ROM facility 
utilization rates at bank level. Since banks’ may consider ROM utilization rates as 
commercial secret, such bank level data is not publically available. However, this 
doesn’t mean the formulae in equation 10 can’t be evaluated. Suppose there is at least a 
bank utilizing the ROM facility (i.e. 𝐾 > 0), and the utilization rate of ROM by banks is 
common at any time period 𝑡 (i.e. 𝑅𝑂𝑅𝑡
𝑖 = 𝑅𝑂𝑅𝑡 > 0 ∀ 𝑖 = 1, 2, …𝐾). Then, the M2 
multiplier under ROM turns into formulae as in equation 12. 
𝑚2,𝑡
𝑅𝑂𝑀 =
1 + 𝜌(𝑟) + 𝑐𝑡
[𝑟𝑟1 + 𝑟𝑟2𝜌(𝑟)]{1 − 𝑅𝑂𝑅𝑡 × 𝜃𝑡} + [𝑘1(𝑟) + 𝑘2(𝑟)𝜌(𝑟)] + 𝑐𝑡
 (12) 
where 𝜃𝑡 is the share of total domestic currency checkable deposits at the banks 
utilizing the ROM facility at time period 𝑡 i.e. 𝜃𝑡 =
∑ 𝐷𝑡
𝑖𝑖=𝐾
𝑖=1
∑ 𝐷𝑡
𝑖𝑖=𝑁
𝑖=1
. According to this 
                                                 
5 Note that banks’ use of reserve option mechanism 𝑅𝑂𝑅𝑖 must lie within the limits as set by 
monetary authority. 
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formulation, ceteris paribus, the higher the share of domestic currency checkable 
deposits (or required reserves to be maintained) at the banks utilizing the ROM facility 
(higher 𝜃), the larger the M2 multiplier.  
Each bank’s utilization rate of the ROM facility depends on the relative cost of 
acquiring domestic currency and/or FX funding and other bank specific factors. 
Suppose all banks have the same level of ability obtaining domestic currency funding 
and/or FX funding i.e. there is not any credit constraint and no bank specific factors 
exist. When bank 𝑖 decides to fulfill domestic currency required reserves without 
utilizing the ROM facility, the total cost of acquiring domestic currency funding at time 
period 𝑡 equals to [𝑟𝑟1 × 𝐷𝑡
𝑖 + 𝑟𝑟2 × 𝑇𝐷𝑡
𝑖] × 𝑟𝑡. When bank 𝑖 decides to fulfill domestic 
currency required reserves utilizing ROM facility at a rate of 𝑅𝑂𝑅𝑡
𝑖, the total cost of 
acquiring funding at time period 𝑡 equals to the cost of domestic currency funding (1 −
𝑅𝑂𝑅𝑡
𝑖)[𝑟𝑟1 × 𝐷𝑡
𝑖 + 𝑟𝑟2 × 𝑇𝐷𝑡
𝑖] × 𝑟𝑡 plus the cost of acquiring FX funding 𝑅𝑂𝑅𝑡
𝑖 ×
𝑅𝑂𝐶(𝑅𝑂𝑅𝑡
𝑖) × [𝑟𝑟1 × 𝐷𝑡
𝑖 + 𝑟𝑟2 × 𝑇𝐷𝑡
𝑖] × 𝑟𝑡
∗ ×
𝐸𝑡[𝑒𝑡+1]
𝑒𝑡
 where 𝑟𝑡 is domestic market 
interest rate, 𝑟𝑡
∗ is foreign market interest rate, 𝑒𝑡 is nominal spot exchange rate 
(domestic currency per USD) at time period 𝑡, and 𝐸𝑡 is the expectation operator 
conditional on the information observed through time period 𝑡. The term 
𝑅𝑂𝐶(𝑅𝑂𝑅𝑡
𝑖) stands for the corresponding trench of reserve options coefficient based on 
banks’ choice of utilization rate of the ROM facility at time period 𝑡. The bank 
optimizes the utilization rate 𝑅𝑂𝑅𝑡
𝑖 at any time period 𝑡 where the associated costs for 
utilization and non-utilization of the ROM facility are equal. Hence, the threshold 
reserve options coefficient at any time period 𝑡 𝑅𝑂𝐶𝑡
𝑡𝑟 can be expressed as following 
15 
 
𝑅𝑂𝐶𝑡
𝑡𝑟 =
𝑟𝑡
𝑟𝑡
∗ ×
𝐸𝑡[𝑒𝑡+1]
𝑒𝑡
 
(13) 
Note that each bank’s threshold reserve options coefficient may differ due to each 
bank’s utilization rate of the ROM facility 𝑅𝑂𝑅𝑖 which in turn is determined by solving 
each bank’s profit maximization problem considering the relative cost of domestic and 
FX funding as described in equation (13) plus credit constraints and other bank specific 
factors. Our focus in this paper is not on banks’ individual profit maximization behavior 
towards the use of ROM facility. 
Comparative statics for M2 multiplier under ROM: 
i. Changes in the required reserve ratios 𝑟𝑟1 and/or 𝑟𝑟2: When required 
reserve ratios 𝑟𝑟1 and/or 𝑟𝑟2 rise/fall, 𝑚2,𝑡
𝑅𝑂𝑀 falls/rises i.e. 𝑟𝑟1 and/or 𝑟𝑟2 and 
𝑚2,𝑡
𝑅𝑂𝑀 are negatively related. 
𝜕𝑚2,𝑡
𝑅𝑂𝑀
𝜕𝑟𝑟1
< 0;        
𝜕𝑚2,𝑡
𝑅𝑂𝑀
𝜕𝑟𝑟2
< 0 
ii. Changes in the currency deposits ratio 𝑐: When currency deposits ratio 𝑐𝑡 
rises/falls, 𝑚2,𝑡
𝑅𝑂𝑀 falls/rises i.e. 𝑐𝑡 and 𝑚2,𝑡
𝑅𝑂𝑀 are negatively related. 
𝜕𝑚2,𝑡
𝑅𝑂𝑀
𝜕𝑐𝑡
< 0 
iii. Changes in elements of excess reserve ratio 𝑘1(𝑟) and/or 𝑘2(𝑟): 
When 𝑘1(𝑟) and/or 𝑘2(𝑟) rise/fall, 𝑚2,𝑡
𝑅𝑂𝑀 falls/rises i.e. 𝑘1(𝑟) 
and/or 𝑘2(𝑟)and 𝑚2,𝑡
𝑅𝑂𝑀 are negatively related. 
𝜕𝑚2,𝑡
𝑅𝑂𝑀
𝜕𝑘1
< 0;        
𝜕𝑚2,𝑡
𝑅𝑂𝑀
𝜕𝑘2
< 0 
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iv. Changes in the number of banks utilizing the ROM facility 𝐾: When the 
number of banks 𝐾 utilizing the ROM facility rises/falls, 𝑚2,𝑡
𝑅𝑂𝑀 rises/falls 
i.e. 𝐾 and 𝑚2,𝑡
𝑅𝑂𝑀 are positively related. 
𝜕𝑚2,𝑡
𝑅𝑂𝑀
𝜕𝐾
> 0 
v. Changes in the banks’ utilization rate of the reserve options mechanism: 
When the banks’ utilization rate 𝑅𝑂𝑅𝑖 of the ROM facility rises/falls, 
𝑚2,𝑡
𝑅𝑂𝑀 rises/falls i.e. 𝑅𝑂𝑅𝑖 and 𝑚2,𝑡
𝑅𝑂𝑀 are positively related. 
𝜕𝑚2,𝑡
𝑅𝑂𝑀
𝜕𝑅𝑂𝑅𝑖
> 0 
vi. Changes in the domestic money market interest rates 𝑟: When money market 
interest rates rises/falls, 𝑚2,𝑡
𝑅𝑂𝑀 rises/falls i.e. 𝑟 and 𝑚2,𝑡
𝑅𝑂𝑀 are positively 
related. Using M2 multiplier formulae in equations 10, 11, and 12, partial 
derivatives described by equations A1, A2, and A3 in Appendix II prove that 
𝜕𝑚2,𝑡
𝑅𝑂𝑀
𝜕𝑟
> 0   
The rationale behind this finding is simple. When 𝑟 rises it is more costly to 
find domestic currency funding than FX funding and therefore banks start 
utilizing the ROM facility more intensely (given that the bank is not already 
utilizing the ROM facility fully) i.e. 𝑅𝑂𝑅𝑡
𝑖  rises when 𝑟 rises and this would 
lead to an increase in threshold reserve option coefficient 𝑅𝑂𝐶𝑡
𝑡𝑟 and finally 
the utilization rate rises since reserve option ratio and reserve option 
coefficient are positively related. 
According to equations 10 and 11, money (M2) multiplier in a monetary system 
with ROM is more sensitive to the domestic market interest rate changes as shown by 
equations A4 and A4 in Appendix II. 
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V. Empirical analysis and results 
We first calculate M2 multiplier using Turkish data from Dec. 2005 to Feb. 2015 and 
illustrate our computations. Figure 5 plots M2 multiplier under and w/o ROM against 
the log of monetary aggregates: monetary base and M2 along with market interest rates. 
The figure reveals three key features. First, there is a 
Figure 5. Money (M2) multiplier, Monetary aggregates and interest rates 
 
 
Notes: Data has monthly frequency covering the period from December 2005 to February 2015. M2 
multiplier under ROM is calculated assuming 𝜃 = 0.90 due to Aslaner et al., 2014 which reports that 
the share of total domestic currency checkable deposits (or reserve requirements to be maintained) at 
the banks utilizing the ROM facility constitutes 91% of the banking sector. M2 multiplier w/o ROM is 
calculated by setting 𝜃 = 0. 
 
sharp drop and a subsequent significant rise in M2 multiplier during 2011. Second, M2 
multiplier under ROM is significantly larger. Third, a decisive upward trend in M2 
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multiplier become evident with the inception of ROM to the monetary system. The 
sharp drop and the subsequent rise in M2 multiplier during Dec. 2010 to Sept. 2011 
seem to reflect changes in required reserve ratios rather than changes in other 
components of M2 multiplier. In Dec. 17, 2010, the CBRT announced Turkish lira 
required reserve ratio would be differentiated according to the maturity structure of 
deposits starting Jan. 2011. In addition, significant increases were introduced in the 
required reserves ratios. From Dec. 2010 to Sept. 2011, common reserve requirement 
ratio sharply rose from 5.5 to 16 and about 13 percent on checkable and time deposits, 
respectively. The rates were re-adjusted again in Oct. 2011 where required reserves 
ratios were set to about 11 percent. Figure 6 shows the time path of required reserve 
ratios on checkable and time deposits. 
Figure 6. Reserve requirement ratios 
 
 
Notes: Data has monthly frequency covering the period from December 2005 to February 2015. Time 
deposits reserve requirement ratio (RRR) is the weighted average of the required ratios for one-month, 
three-months, six-months, one-year and longer deposits since 2011. 
 
The sharp drop in M2 multiplier during Dec. 2010 to Sept. 2011 is mainly reflected by 
step increase in the reserve requirement ratios as indicated in Figure 6. Subsequently, 
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when the Central Bank set required reserves ratios back to about 11 percent, M2 
multiplier picked back up from a bottom of 2.5 to 3.5 as indicated in Figure 5. 
According to Figure 5, average M2 multiplier under and w/o ROM is about 4.3 
vs. 3.6 during Sept. 2011 to Feb. 2015, respectively. The p-value associated with 
Student’s paired t-test with one tailed distribution is 0.0000 indicating significantly 
larger M2 multiplier under ROM. There is a definite upward trend in M2 multiplier 
along with monetary base and M2. Average slope of upward trend in M2 multiplier 
under ROM equals to 0.24 whereas 0.17 for that of w/o ROM. The rise in the size and 
altered trend behavior of M2 multiplier seem to reflect the introduction of ROM facility 
to the monetary system and the changes it triggered in the components of M2 multiplier. 
Figure 7 gives a visual summary of the underlying components of M2 multiplier 
under ROM and how they change over time. There is steady long-run declining trend in 
required reserves ratio (as described by [𝑟𝑟1 + 𝑟𝑟2𝜌(𝑟)]{1 − 𝑅𝑂𝑅𝑡 × 𝜃𝑡}), excess 
reserves ratio, and currency deposit ratio 𝑐 from Dec. 2008 and onwards except for the 
period of Apr. 2011 to Oct. 2011, the period with sharp drop and a subsequent rise in 
M2 multiplier. The declining trend in required and excess reserves ratios seem to be 
reinforced by the introduction of ROM around Sept. 2011. Comparative statistics ii, iii, 
and v predict negative relationship between M2 multiplier and currency deposit ratio, 
excess reserves ratio, and ROM utilization rate. The data suggests that the slight upward 
trend found in M2 multiplier around Dec. 2008 to Aug. 2010 is due to slight declining 
trend in currency deposit ratio, excess reserves and required reserves ratios (as 
described by [𝑟𝑟1 + 𝑟𝑟2𝜌(𝑟)]) w/o ROM. M2 multiplier rises even further due to large 
decreases in excess and required reserves ratios around Sept. 2011, the date for 
inception of ROM to the monetary system, and onwards. Required reserves ratio refers 
to [𝑟𝑟1 + 𝑟𝑟2𝜌(𝑟)]{1 − 𝑅𝑂𝑅𝑡 × 𝜃𝑡} aftermath of Sept. 2011 by the introduction of 
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ROM. Hence, the decrease in required reserves ratio could be due to changes in 
[𝑟𝑟1 + 𝑟𝑟2𝜌(𝑟)] and/or changes in ROM utilization rate i.e. in {1 − 𝑅𝑂𝑅𝑡 × 𝜃𝑡}. We 
find about 60 percent of the increase in the multiplier is due to the inception of ROM 
facility and its utilization by banks. 
Figure 7. Money (M2) multiplier components 
 
 
Notes: Data has monthly frequency covering the period from December 2005 to February 2015. 
Excess reserves and currency deposit ratios refers to total excess reserves divided by total checkable 
deposits and currency in circulation divided by total checkable deposits, respectively. Required 
reserves ratio refers to [𝑟𝑟1 + 𝑟𝑟2𝜌(𝑟)]{1 − 𝑅𝑂𝑅𝑡 × 𝜃𝑡}. 
 
Table 1 gives estimated long-run trends in M2 multiplier under ROM and its 
components. The estimates provide evidence for significant shifts in the long-behavior 
of M2 multiplier, required and excess reserves with the introduction of ROM to the 
monetary system. Trend estimates for M2 multiplier rise from 0.13 to 0.61 percent 
when the period of estimation is narrowed from full sample of 2005m12-2015m2 to 
2011m9-2015m2 in which ROM is in effective use. Abrupt decline in M2 multiplier 
during Dec. 2010 to Oct. 2011 is due to significant upward shifts in excess and required 
reserves as shown in Figure 6. Significant rise in excess reserves seem to reflect cost 
efficiency as indicated by significant drops in market interest rates depicted in Figure 5. 
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Abrupt changes in required reserves, on the other hand, reflect pure updates in the 
reserve requirement ratios as discussed above. 
The evolution of required and excess reserves series can be characterized by two 
distinct phases. Trend estimate for required reserves rises from -0.14 to 1.61, whereas 
excess reserves ratios decreases from -0.80 to -2.40 percent when the period of 
estimation is narrowed from 2005m12-2015m2 to 2011m9-2015m2. The percentage 
change is trend estimate for currency in circulation is about 20 percent, a relatively 
small drop in 𝑐 from -0.17 to -0.20 percent when entire period of 2005m12-2015m2 is 
narrowed to 2011m9-2015m2. Theoretically, decreases in required reserves and 
currency in circulation ratios increases M2 multiplier whereas rise in excess reserves 
decreases the multiplier.  
Table 1. Estimated long-run trend in M2 multiplier and its components 
Period & Variable (𝑋) 
Trend    
per-month 
t-statistics p-value 
Adjusted       
R-squared 
2005m12 – 2015m2     
M2 multiplier 0.13% 3.09 0.00 0.017 
Currency in circulation ratio -0.17% -10.38 0.00 0.535 
Required reserves ratio -0.14% -1.98 0.00 -0.050 
Excess reserves ratio -0.80% -8.08 0.00 0.347 
Time-Checkable deposits ratio -0.24% -8.10 0.00 0.368 
     
2005m12 – 2011m8     
M2 multiplier -0.15% -1.73 0.00 -0.055 
Currency in circulation ratio -0.07% -2.00 0.05 0.128 
Required reserves ratio 0.46% 3.31 0.00 0.047 
Excess reserves ratio 0.32% 2.23 0.03 0.004 
Time-Checkable deposits ratio 0.00% 1.53 0.13 -0.010 
     
2011m9 – 2015m2     
M2 multiplier 0.61% 3.92 0.00 0.180 
Currency in circulation ratio -0.20% -4.17 0.00 0.458 
Required reserves ratio -1.61% -9.52 0.00 0.673 
Excess reserves ratio -2.40% -7.74 0.00 0.577 
Time-Checkable deposits ratio -0.71% -17.02 0.00 0.884 
Notes: Trend is estimated from an OLS regression where log of 𝑋 is regressed on an intercept, a 
linear time trend and eleven monthly seasonal dummies. 
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Hence, the data suggests that the rise in M2 multiplier mainly come from the changes in 
banks’ behavior with respect to required reserves which in turn are influenced by 
introduction of the ROM facility the monetary system. 
Taking log and first differencing equation 1 of the model yields month-to-month 
percentage growth in M2 that can be decomposed into two factors: percentage growth in 
monetary base and M2 multiplier. Table 2 reports summary statistics for M2, monetary 
base 𝑀𝐵, and the M2 multiplier over the full period from Dec. 2005 to Feb. 2015 as 
well as for two sub-periods with and w/o ROM.  
Table 2. The stability of M2 multiplier 
 
Average monthly       
growth rates 
Average monthly variance and covariance 
 𝑀2̂ 𝑀?̂? ?̂?2 𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑀2) 𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑀𝐵) 𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑚2) 𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑚2, 𝑀𝐵) 
2005m12-2015m2 1.34% 1.71% 0.21% 0.1951 0.3734 0.0223 0.0182 
        
2005m12-2011m8 1.62% 1.92% -0.56% 0.1080 0.1130 0.0204 -0.0267 
2011m9-2015m2 0.88% 1.36% 1.47% 0.0177 0.0679 0.0179 0.0163 
Notes: ^ refers to month-to-month percentage change as calculated by taking the first log difference of the variables. 
 
Confirming the graphical evidence indicated in Figure 5, Table 2 reports that monthly 
average growth rates in monetary aggregates of M2 and MB, and M2 multiplier under 
ROM are positive over the entire period of Dec. 2005 to Feb. 2015. When the full 
sample is split into two sub-periods based on availability of ROM facility, the average 
growth rate in the multiplier changes from -0.56 to 1.47, respectively. Average monthly 
growth rate of M2 multiplier changes to from -0.56 to 0.28 even when the period of Jan. 
2011 to Aug. 2011 with large swings is dropped from the period of Dec. 2005 to Aug. 
2011. This finding confirms M2 multiplier under ROM has a larger trend component 
than that of w/o ROM. 
The right hand panel in Table 2 give variance and covariance estimates to study 
short-run dynamics in monetary aggregates and the M2 multiplier. First, no matter the 
size of the sample, the variance of M2 is lower than that of 𝑀𝐵 indicating M2 being 
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more stable than is monetary base in the short-run. According to Table 2, the variance 
on M2 multiplier is reduced from 0.02 to 0.01 when the full sample is narrowed to Sept. 
2011 to Feb. 2015. This finding suggest that the volatility in M2 multiplier decreases 
with the introduction of ROM to the monetary system. 
Figures 8A and 8B report strong seasonal pattern in M2 multiplier under and 
w/o ROM, required and excess reserves ratios, and relatively weaker seasonal pattern in 
currency in circulation ratio. According to Figure 8A, seasonal pattern is influenced by 
the introduction of ROM facility to the monetary system. Seasonal behavior during the 
first half of the year seem to become stronger with the introduction of ROM whereas the 
opposite is true for the second half of the year with the exception of November. M2 
multiplier rises significantly in January, drop abruptly in June and rebounds by the end 
of the year. During other months, with the exception of July and October, there don’t 
seem to be a distinct seasonal pattern in M2 multiplier. 
Figure 8A. Seasonal patterns in M2 multiplier 
 
 
Notes: Data has monthly frequency covering the period from December 2005 to February 2015. The 
figures show average monthly deviations from mean. 
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Currency in circulation ratio falls sharply in February, June, and December 
while it rises significantly in August, October, and November as indicated in Figure 8B. 
The substantial increase in cash holdings relative to deposits in August seem to reflects 
crop purchases and harvest season. Required reserves ratio rise significantly in January 
and February and towards the end of the year while it drops abruptly during the March-
July period. A closer look at the seasonal behavior of M2 multiplier in Figure 8A and 
that of required reserves in Figure 8B reveals significant seasonal comovement between 
the two series. In contrast, Figure 8B provide evidence that excess reserves ratio behave 
with strong opposite seasonal pattern compared to required reserves ratio. 
Figure 8B. Seasonal patterns in RR, ER, and CC ratios 
 
 
Notes: Data has monthly frequency covering the period from December 2005 to February 2015. The 
figures show average monthly deviations from mean. Required reserves (RR) ratio, Excess reserves 
ratio (ER) and Currency in circulation (CC) ratio are found by dividing these figures with total amount 
of checkable deposits. 
 
Now, we turn our attention onto the stabilizing role of money multiplier under 
ROM under substantial capital outflows and inflows. First, consider a hypothetical 
situation where an economy experiences substantial capital outflows. Capital outflows 
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domestic currency is reduced/softened via two channels: a direct and an indirect 
channels. The direct channel is due to changes in banks’ behavior in use of ROM 
facility which alters the supply of foreign exchange at the FX market via changes in 
currently held international reserves of the monetary authority as explained in Alper et 
al., 2013. Periods with capital outflows are usually characterized by increase in FX 
funding cost relative to domestic currency and tightening of external borrowing 
constraints. Increases in foreign exchange relative to domestic currency funding costs 
induce banks to use ROM facility less intensely. Lower utilization of ROM would 
release some of the required reserves kept in FX at the Central bank to the FX market 
which would reduce the depreciation pressure on domestic currency. The second and 
indirect channel is due to changes in the money multiplier stimulated by banks’ decision 
on the utilization of the ROM facility. Lower utilization of the ROM facility reduces 
money (M2) multiplier as proved in comparative statics v6. If the monetary authority 
allows private market forces to determine the domestic interest rate i.e. if the monetary 
authority remain passive and does not engage in domestic open market operations, 
domestic interest rate rise. The stimulated increase in domestic interest rate would 
contain capital outflows limiting depreciation pressure on domestic currency. This 
finding provide basis for Aslaner et al., 2014 where the authors argue active interest rate 
policy responses to capital flows undermine automatic stabilizing feature of the ROM 
facility. 
Capital inflows, on the other hand, induce banks to utilize ROM facility more 
intensely which contains appreciation pressure on domestic currency as discussed in 
                                                 
6 Since bank use domestic currency more intensely to satisfy reserve requirements, lower 
utilization of the ROM facility reduces domestic money supply directly, as well. 
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Alper et al., 2013. Moreover, higher utilization of ROM increases money (M2) 
multiplier as proved in comparative statics v. If the monetary authority allows private 
market forces to determine the domestic interest rate, domestic interest rate fall. The fall 
in domestic interest rate would slow down capital inflows reducing appreciation 
pressure on domestic currency. 
VI. Conclusion 
In this paper, our objective was to study Reserve Option Mechanism (ROM), a recently 
introduced macroprudential monetary policy instrument, and its impact on the behavior 
of money multiplier. To this end, we analytically derive a generalized money (M2) 
multiplier under ROM and assess size, stability and seasonal properties quantitatively. 
Our case study is Turkish economy where we use monthly data during the decade 2005 
to 2015. We report one time significant rise in the size of money multiplier and slight 
upward adjustment in the long run trend component of the multiplier due to adoption of 
ROM. Moreover, empirical evidence suggests substantial change in the seasonal 
behavior of the multiplier, cash ratio, required and excess reserves with ROM. We 
report money multiplier is strongly seasonal along with significant readjustment within 
year movements in the multiplier under a monetary system with ROM. Strong seasonal 
movements in required and excess reserves, the components of money multiplier, prove 
to be the underlying forces behind strong seasonal behavioral changes in the money 
multiplier. We show that money multiplier is substantially less volatile in a monetary 
system with ROM. We discuss the stabilizing impact of Reserve Option Mechanism in 
the foreign exchange market via adjustments in money multiplier responding to banks’ 
managerial decisions over required reserves. The actual mechanism through which the 
introduced money multiplier under ROM reduces the size of variations in the foreign 
exchange market remain an open question for future studies.  
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VIII. Appendix 
Appendix I: Data 
    
Currency 
in 
circulation 
Required 
reserves 
Excess 
reserves 
Checkable 
deposits  
Time 
deposits  
Interbank 
overnight 
O/N rates 
Reserve 
requirement 
ratios 
Reserve 
Option 
Ratio  
Date 𝑴𝑩 𝑴𝟏 𝑴𝟐 𝑪 𝑹𝑹 𝑬𝑹 𝑫 𝑻𝑫 𝒓 𝒓𝒓𝟏 𝒓𝒓𝟐 𝑹𝑶𝑹 
(in billions of Turkish lira) (percent, %) 
Dec-05 47.78 45.31 161.44 20.03 9.40 18.26 25.28 116.13 13.57 6.00 6.00  
Jan-06 42.04 40.52 157.45 19.50 9.82 12.70 21.02 116.93 13.50 6.00 6.00  
Feb-06 42.44 41.39 163.10 19.55 9.82 13.05 21.85 121.70 13.50 6.00 6.00  
Mar-06 47.16 43.61 170.85 20.65 10.48 16.01 22.96 127.24 13.50 6.00 6.00  
Apr-06 49.64 44.56 174.86 21.83 10.34 17.45 22.74 130.29 13.49 6.00 6.00  
May-06 47.84 47.38 181.93 22.45 12.12 13.25 24.93 134.54 13.25 6.00 6.00  
Jun-06 55.23 49.38 187.13 23.75 12.40 19.07 25.63 137.75 15.11 6.00 6.00  
Jul-06 50.81 47.08 183.01 23.18 11.76 15.83 23.91 135.93 17.33 6.00 6.00  
Aug-06 51.08 47.68 183.30 23.38 11.81 15.88 24.30 135.62 17.50 6.00 6.00  
Sep-06 54.38 48.35 186.94 23.81 12.41 18.15 24.54 138.59 17.50 6.00 6.00  
Oct-06 50.59 47.13 186.80 23.66 12.43 14.47 23.46 139.68 17.50 6.00 6.00  
Nov-06 49.18 45.64 189.54 22.68 13.16 13.31 22.96 143.90 17.50 6.00 6.00  
Dec-06 61.23 51.90 195.20 27.37 12.86 20.89 24.52 143.30 17.50 6.00 6.00  
Jan-07 51.90 44.01 193.67 21.70 13.38 16.80 22.31 149.66 17.50 6.00 6.00  
Feb-07 56.82 44.49 193.99 21.80 13.35 21.67 22.69 149.50 17.50 6.00 6.00  
Mar-07 54.76 44.70 197.59 22.76 13.26 18.73 21.94 152.90 17.50 6.00 6.00  
Apr-07 56.87 47.03 200.89 23.53 13.10 20.22 23.50 153.86 17.50 6.00 6.00  
May-07 51.92 47.65 204.10 23.35 13.04 15.50 24.29 156.45 17.50 6.00 6.00  
Jun-07 60.35 50.27 210.35 25.23 13.48 21.62 25.03 160.08 17.50 6.00 6.00  
Jul-07 58.23 50.42 214.28 24.85 13.71 19.65 25.57 163.86 17.50 6.00 6.00  
Aug-07 60.23 52.73 220.57 26.46 13.78 19.97 26.27 167.84 17.50 6.00 6.00  
Sep-07 59.11 51.90 220.48 26.72 12.97 19.42 25.18 168.59 17.36 6.00 6.00  
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Oct-07 56.03 51.81 222.10 26.27 13.09 16.66 25.54 170.30 17.01 6.00 6.00  
Nov-07 59.47 54.01 227.00 27.27 13.20 18.99 26.75 172.99 16.48 6.00 6.00  
Dec-07 66.77 57.81 237.65 28.08 13.13 25.45 29.73 179.84 15.99 6.00 6.00  
Jan-08 60.50 53.11 238.23 26.20 13.53 20.74 26.91 185.12 15.64 6.00 6.00  
Feb-08 62.37 55.30 242.06 27.30 13.58 21.47 28.00 186.76 15.37 6.00 6.00  
Mar-08 66.51 58.88 253.28 28.96 14.79 22.73 29.91 194.40 15.25 6.00 6.00  
Apr-08 63.51 58.78 255.27 29.19 14.79 19.51 29.59 196.48 15.25 6.00 6.00  
May-08 67.63 57.57 252.03 29.56 14.72 23.34 28.01 194.46 15.49 6.00 6.00  
Jun-08 74.82 61.17 259.94 30.07 15.11 29.63 31.10 198.77 15.99 6.00 6.00  
Jul-08 71.47 60.27 263.48 29.96 14.93 26.54 30.31 203.21 16.47 6.00 6.00  
Aug-08 64.82 59.62 264.13 30.36 15.32 19.13 29.26 204.51 16.75 6.00 6.00  
Sep-08 74.39 69.78 283.14 36.54 15.46 22.38 33.24 213.36 16.75 6.00 6.00  
Oct-08 80.73 65.41 289.40 33.71 17.00 29.99 31.70 223.99 16.75 6.00 6.00  
Nov-08 83.37 64.14 296.13 34.02 17.63 31.71 30.12 231.99 16.58 6.00 6.00  
Dec-08 85.23 65.52 304.22 32.46 13.64 38.99 33.06 238.70 15.66 6.00 6.00  
Jan-09 71.18 62.31 302.79 32.21 13.34 25.61 30.10 240.48 13.95 6.00 6.00  
Feb-09 75.12 67.15 308.50 33.80 13.77 27.53 33.34 241.35 12.55 5.00 5.00  
Mar-09 85.89 66.89 307.16 34.01 13.75 38.13 32.89 240.27 11.14 5.00 5.00  
Apr-09 74.51 68.48 304.04 35.09 13.25 26.15 33.39 235.56 10.18 5.00 5.00  
May-09 80.02 67.97 305.24 34.44 13.36 32.20 33.53 237.28 9.49 5.00 5.00  
Jun-09 82.91 69.62 312.27 34.42 13.12 35.36 35.20 242.65 9.02 5.00 5.00  
Jul-09 75.68 70.17 314.51 34.61 12.72 28.34 35.57 244.33 8.51 5.00 5.00  
Aug-09 73.08 70.01 316.27 34.82 13.32 24.92 35.19 246.26 8.04 5.00 5.00  
Sep-09 88.89 75.78 323.56 36.45 13.40 39.02 39.33 247.78 7.58 5.00 5.00  
Oct-09 79.82 74.94 327.37 37.06 13.55 29.21 37.88 252.43 7.01 5.00 5.00  
Nov-09 74.80 82.92 340.32 43.23 13.60 17.96 39.69 257.40 6.68 5.00 5.00  
Dec-09 85.43 83.42 350.22 38.73 13.07 33.57 44.69 266.80 6.50 5.00 5.00  
Jan-10 75.00 77.29 346.95 37.47 13.28 24.24 39.82 269.66 6.50 5.00 5.00  
Feb-10 76.22 82.11 358.61 38.85 13.52 23.84 43.26 276.50 6.50 5.00 5.00  
Mar-10 78.76 82.87 365.60 39.13 13.12 26.50 43.74 282.73 6.50 5.00 5.00  
Apr-10 83.29 83.88 364.32 40.77 13.67 28.83 43.11 280.44 6.50 5.00 5.00  
May-10 84.78 86.69 378.08 41.94 15.01 27.83 44.76 291.39 6.50 5.00 5.00  
Jun-10 92.63 91.90 393.73 43.02 14.99 34.60 48.88 301.83 6.50 5.00 5.00  
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Jul-10 85.39 90.50 391.13 44.34 15.27 25.77 46.16 300.64 6.50 5.00 5.00  
Aug-10 88.71 93.11 392.70 45.50 16.39 26.80 47.61 299.59 6.50 5.00 5.00  
Sep-10 91.12 95.44 397.66 45.69 17.09 28.33 49.75 302.22 6.38 5.00 5.00  
Oct-10 96.69 97.73 402.13 48.34 19.73 28.61 49.39 304.40 6.00 6.00 6.00  
Nov-10 102.11 97.55 411.31 47.86 20.90 33.33 49.69 313.76 3.75 6.00 6.00  
Dec-10 105.94 109.22 439.53 49.66 21.51 34.64 59.56 330.31 1.63 6.00 6.00  
Jan-11 118.02 103.72 436.65 49.12 22.49 46.39 54.59 332.94 1.50 8.00 7.00  
Feb-11 127.87 105.94 447.03 50.05 22.20 55.62 55.89 341.09 1.50 11.00 9.00  
Mar-11 124.46 107.64 453.47 50.50 22.18 51.77 57.13 345.83 1.50 12.00 9.00  
Apr-11 146.75 110.76 456.62 53.31 23.45 69.98 57.46 345.86 1.50 15.00 13.00  
May-11 158.84 113.22 470.17 53.49 26.73 78.60 59.72 356.96 1.50 16.00 13.00  
Jun-11 167.29 119.93 478.11 55.21 27.41 84.66 64.72 358.19 1.50 16.00 13.00  
Jul-11 167.38 119.63 480.80 56.81 28.17 82.39 62.82 361.16 1.50 16.00 13.00  
Aug-11 177.41 128.36 488.35 64.18 27.04 86.18 64.18 359.99 4.33 16.00 13.00  
Sep-11 171.54 121.37 480.49 58.46 33.35 79.72 62.91 359.12 5.00 16.00 13.00 8.00 
Oct-11 169.92 118.93 473.93 58.50 37.58 73.83 60.43 355.00 5.33 16.00 12.00 16.00 
Nov-11 154.87 116.86 472.55 56.04 49.32 49.49 60.82 355.69 5.71 11.00 11.00 34.00 
Dec-11 147.36 121.39 481.10 56.02 50.62 40.66 65.37 359.71 5.39 11.00 11.00 36.00 
Jan-12 138.18 111.56 470.18 52.65 50.28 35.25 58.91 358.62 5.12 11.00 11.00 36.00 
Feb-12 147.02 111.34 471.57 52.16 51.05 43.81 59.18 360.23 5.00 11.00 11.00 36.00 
Mar-12 152.85 113.01 477.10 54.08 52.28 46.48 58.92 364.09 5.00 11.00 11.00 36.00 
Apr-12 155.69 115.96 479.86 55.38 57.35 42.94 60.58 363.90 5.00 11.00 11.00 36.00 
May-12 154.59 116.47 481.82 54.60 58.73 41.25 61.87 365.35 5.00 11.00 11.00 36.00 
Jun-12 154.17 124.31 492.12 57.82 64.88 31.47 66.49 367.81 5.00 11.00 11.00 41.00 
Jul-12 160.36 120.57 497.12 57.08 74.90 28.37 63.49 376.55 5.00 11.00 11.00 49.00 
Aug-12 173.97 126.58 505.40 61.13 86.67 26.16 65.46 378.81 5.00 11.00 11.00 54.00 
Sep-12 176.06 131.87 515.65 61.87 89.50 24.69 70.00 383.79 5.00 11.00 11.00 56.00 
Oct-12 188.40 132.84 524.53 64.96 97.04 26.39 67.88 391.69 5.00 11.00 11.00 54.00 
Nov-12 183.98 128.30 522.27 61.33 99.67 22.97 66.97 393.97 5.00 11.00 11.00 54.00 
Dec-12 190.25 135.40 536.23 61.57 100.19 28.43 73.83 400.83 5.00 11.00 11.00 52.00 
Jan-13 190.31 128.31 530.91 59.06 107.17 24.07 69.25 402.60 4.92 11.00 11.00 52.00 
Feb-13 197.44 131.77 541.09 59.84 110.16 27.43 71.93 409.32 4.66 11.00 11.00 53.00 
Mar-13 211.38 137.23 550.55 62.27 116.20 32.89 74.96 413.32 4.59 12.00 11.00 52.00 
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Apr-13 213.33 137.78 554.66 62.75 122.64 27.93 75.03 416.88 4.29 12.00 11.00 55.00 
May-13 218.15 146.68 577.03 65.02 120.90 32.22 81.66 430.35 3.75 12.00 11.00 50.00 
Jun-13 223.12 158.87 593.10 70.02 116.87 36.22 88.85 434.23 3.74 12.00 11.00 46.00 
Jul-13 221.76 157.68 600.45 71.17 122.57 28.00 86.51 442.76 3.58 12.00 11.00 47.00 
Aug-13 252.88 163.99 601.95 75.15 142.53 35.19 88.84 437.96 4.42 12.00 11.00 50.00 
Sep-13 253.44 167.83 614.63 76.34 142.41 34.68 91.49 446.80 4.01 12.00 11.00 51.00 
Oct-13 254.50 166.17 616.44 76.37 146.23 31.88 89.80 450.27 3.91 12.00 11.00 53.00 
Nov-13 253.51 165.24 618.83 75.87 145.83 31.80 89.37 453.59 4.74 12.00 11.00 54.00 
Dec-13 264.73 175.70 632.86 76.04 156.38 32.21 99.66 457.16 5.80 12.00 11.00 54.00 
Jan-14 273.06 169.26 623.20 76.48 162.16 34.41 92.78 453.94 7.64 12.00 11.00 53.00 
Feb-14 278.80 168.05 618.68 77.61 167.86 33.32 90.44 450.63 8.20 12.00 11.00 55.00 
Mar-14 278.01 169.50 618.83 78.97 162.08 36.96 90.54 449.33 10.21 12.00 11.00 56.00 
Apr-14 277.50 169.94 621.66 79.22 166.48 31.79 90.71 451.72 9.97 12.00 11.00 57.00 
May-14 273.88 170.50 624.03 79.81 165.77 28.29 90.69 453.54 9.41 12.00 11.00 57.00 
Jun-14 283.17 180.35 651.40 82.13 169.61 31.43 98.22 471.05 8.00 12.00 11.00 57.00 
Jul-14 287.76 191.57 669.91 90.56 166.35 30.65 101.01 478.34 7.83 12.00 11.00 57.00 
Aug-14 292.37 187.37 658.98 87.41 174.67 30.07 99.96 471.61 7.50 12.00 11.00 57.00 
Sep-14 303.20 196.97 676.90 91.26 180.93 30.75 105.70 479.93 7.50 12.00 11.00 56.00 
Oct-14 293.18 187.83 659.53 88.50 173.51 30.91 99.33 471.71 7.50 12.00 11.00 57.00 
Nov-14 289.90 185.03 663.38 85.68 175.50 28.42 99.34 478.35 7.50 12.00 11.00 57.00 
Dec-14 298.28 196.66 703.89 86.55 172.33 39.14 110.11 507.23 7.91 12.00 11.00 53.00 
Jan-15 306.15 193.28 699.17 88.09 185.06 32.62 105.19 505.90 7.64 12.00 11.00 54.00 
Feb-15 314.77 201.72 709.22 91.10 187.51 35.77 110.62 507.50 7.46 12.00 11.00 54.00 
Notes: There is a discrepancy between the sum of reserves RR plus ER and currency in circulation C since IMF definition for monetary base MB is adopted where MB is the 
sum of reserves, currency in circulation and banks’ demand deposits at the Central Bank. Reserve requirement ratio rr2 is the weighted average of the required ratios for One-
Month, Three-Months, Six-Months, One-Year and Longer Deposits. Reserve option ratios are realized average ratios for the banking sector. 
Source: Electronic Data Delivery System (EDDS) of the Central Bank of Republic of Turkey. 
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Appendix II: The Model 
Using standard M2 multiplier formulae (equation 11) it is straightforward to 
show that: 
𝜕𝑚2,𝑡
𝜕𝑟
= 𝜌′(𝑟) {(𝑟𝑟1 − 𝑟𝑟2) + [𝑘1(𝑟) − 𝑘2(𝑟)] + 𝑐𝑡[1 − 𝑟𝑟2−𝑘2(𝑟)]}
− [1 + 𝜌(𝑟) + 𝑐𝑡] {𝑘
′
1(𝑟) + 𝑘
′
2(𝑟)𝜌(𝑟)} > 0 
(A1) 
since 𝜌′(𝑟) > 0;  𝑟𝑟1 − 𝑟𝑟2 > 0;  𝑘1(𝑟) − 𝑘2(𝑟) > 0;  𝑘
′
1(𝑟) < 0;  𝑘
′
2(𝑟) < 0 holds. 
Similarly, taking partial derivative of equation 12 reveals that: 
𝜕𝑚2,𝑡
𝑅𝑂𝑀
𝜕𝑟
= 𝜌′(𝑟) {[𝑟𝑟1 − 𝑟𝑟2(1 − 𝑅𝑂𝑅𝑡 × 𝜃𝑡)] + [𝑘1(𝑟) − 𝑘2(𝑟)] + 𝑐𝑡[1 − 𝑟𝑟2(1 − 𝑅𝑂𝑅𝑡 × 𝜃𝑡)−𝑘2(𝑟)]}
− [1 + 𝜌(𝑟) + 𝑐𝑡] {𝑘
′
1(𝑟) + 𝑘
′
2(𝑟)𝜌(𝑟) + (1 − 𝑅𝑂𝑅𝑡 × 𝜃𝑡)
′[𝑟𝑟1 + 𝑟𝑟2𝜌(𝑟)]} > 0 
(A2) 
In addition, taking partial derivative of equation 10 shows that: 
𝜕𝑚2,𝑡
𝑅𝑂𝑀
𝜕𝑟
= 𝜌′(𝑟)
{
 
 
[𝑟𝑟1 − 𝑟𝑟2(1 −
∑ 𝐷𝑡
𝑖 × 𝑅𝑂𝑅𝑡
𝑖𝑖=𝐾
𝑖=1
∑ 𝐷𝑡
𝑖𝑖=𝑁
𝑖=1
)] + [𝑘1(𝑟) − 𝑘2(𝑟)] + 𝑐𝑡 [1 − 𝑟𝑟2(1 −
∑ 𝐷𝑡
𝑖 × 𝑅𝑂𝑅𝑡
𝑖𝑖=𝐾
𝑖=1
∑ 𝐷𝑡
𝑖𝑖=𝑁
𝑖=1
)−𝑘2(𝑟)]
}
 
 
− [1 + 𝜌(𝑟) + 𝑐𝑡]
{
 
 
 
 
𝑘′1(𝑟) + 𝑘
′
2(𝑟)𝜌(𝑟) +
𝜕 (1 −
∑ 𝐷𝑡
𝑖 × 𝑅𝑂𝑅𝑡
𝑖𝑖=𝐾
𝑖=1
∑ 𝐷𝑡
𝑖𝑖=𝑁
𝑖=1
)
𝜕𝑟
[𝑟𝑟1 + 𝑟𝑟2𝜌(𝑟)]
}
 
 
 
 
> 0 
 
(A3) 
since 𝜌′(𝑟) > 0; 𝑟𝑟1 − 𝑟𝑟2 (1 −
∑ 𝐷𝑡
𝑖×𝑅𝑂𝑅𝑡
𝑖𝑖=𝐾
𝑖=1
∑ 𝐷𝑡
𝑖𝑖=𝑁
𝑖=1
) > 0;  𝑘1(𝑟) − 𝑘2(𝑟) > 0;  𝑘
′
1(𝑟) <
0;  𝑘′2(𝑟) < 0; 
𝜕(1−
∑ 𝐷𝑡
𝑖×𝑅𝑂𝑅𝑡
𝑖𝑖=𝐾
𝑖=1
∑ 𝐷𝑡
𝑖𝑖=𝑁
𝑖=1
)
𝜕𝑟
< 0. 
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Note that equation A2 and A3 differs from equation A1 by the blue colored terms due to 
inception of ROM facility to the monetary system. 
According to equations 10 and 11, M2 multiplier in a monetary system with 
ROM facility is more sensitive to the domestic market interest rate changes i.e. 
𝜕𝑚2,𝑡
𝑅𝑂𝑀
𝜕𝑟
−
𝜕𝑚2,𝑡
𝜕𝑟
= 𝜌′(𝑟) [𝑟𝑟2 ×
∑ 𝐷𝑡
𝑖 × 𝑅𝑂𝑅𝑡
𝑖𝑖=𝐾
𝑖=1
∑ 𝐷𝑡
𝑖𝑖=𝑁
𝑖=1
(1 + 𝑐𝑡)]
− [1 + 𝜌(𝑟) + 𝑐𝑡]
{
 
 
 
 𝜕 (1 −
∑ 𝐷𝑡
𝑖 × 𝑅𝑂𝑅𝑡
𝑖𝑖=𝐾
𝑖=1
∑ 𝐷𝑡
𝑖𝑖=𝑁
𝑖=1
)
𝜕𝑟
[𝑟𝑟1 + 𝑟𝑟2𝜌(𝑟)]
}
 
 
 
 
> 0 
 
(A4) 
and/or 
𝜕𝑚2,𝑡
𝑅𝑂𝑀
𝜕𝑟
−
𝜕𝑚2,𝑡
𝜕𝑟
= 𝜌′(𝑟) [𝑟𝑟2 × 𝑅𝑂𝑅𝑡 × 𝜃𝑡(1 + 𝑐𝑡)]
− [1 + 𝜌(𝑟) + 𝑐𝑡] {(1 − 𝑅𝑂𝑅𝑡 × 𝜃𝑡)
′[𝑟𝑟1 + 𝑟𝑟2𝜌(𝑟)]} > 0 
 
(A5) 
 
